governance guides
Faramesh doesn't just "support" frameworks , it hooks into their internals so every tool call is governed at the source. These guides show exactly how Faramesh attaches to each runtime and what the enforcement looks like in practice.
OpenClaw is a tool-calling runtime for LLMs. When you run an OpenClaw agent under Faramesh, every tool dispatch passes through the policy engine before execution.
Faramesh patches OpenClaw's tool execution layer. When the LLM decides to call a tool, OpenClaw hands the call to Faramesh first. Faramesh evaluates the policy, strips ambient credentials, and either permits (with a broker-issued credential), denies (with a reason), or defers (holding for a human).
Faramesh strips the VENDOR_API_KEY environment variable and only issues it after the policy permits api/purchase. If the agent tries to call a tool that's not in the policy, it gets an immediate DENY.
NemoClaw agents use NVIDIA's NeMo framework for LLM-driven tool use. Faramesh wraps the NemoClaw process and owns it end-to-end: framework patching, credential stripping, network isolation, and full policy enforcement.
Faramesh starts NemoClaw as a child process via faramesh run. It injects the auto-patcher via PYTHONPATH, patches the tool dispatch layer at import time, and on Linux activates the kernel sandbox (seccomp-BPF, Landlock, network namespace).
With --enforce full on Linux, NemoClaw is sandboxed at the kernel level. Even if the LLM finds a way to bypass the framework patch, seccomp-BPF and Landlock block unauthorized system calls and filesystem access.
Deep Agents are multi-agent systems built on LangGraph. They use hierarchical agent graphs where a supervisor agent delegates tasks to specialized sub-agents. Faramesh governs every agent in the graph , the supervisor and every worker.
Faramesh patches BaseTool.run() in LangChain and injects AgentMiddleware into the LangGraph execution loop. Every tool call from every agent in the graph passes through the policy engine. Delegation between agents is tracked with cryptographic tokens , the supervisor's permissions are the ceiling for any sub-agent.
The research-worker can only call search/* tools. If it tries db/write, the delegation token check fails and the call is denied immediately , before the policy engine even evaluates it.
IDE agents like Claude Code and Cursor use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to call tools. Faramesh wraps the MCP server process and intercepts every tools/call request at the stdio or HTTP level.
The IDE agent connects to Faramesh instead of the real MCP server. Faramesh forwards tools/list and other non-tool-call methods unchanged, but every tools/call goes through the policy engine first.
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