16 , supply chain
Artifact Integrity and SBOM
Supply-chain controls make governance artifacts verifiable end to end. Policies, binaries, manifests, and compliance exports should be treated as security-critical artifacts with integrity proofs, not as informal files passed between systems. Faramesh includes primitives for SBOM generation, detached signatures, manifest validation, and build metadata verification.
The objective is not only to detect tampering, but to prove artifact lineage during audits and incident response. When a policy or binary changes unexpectedly, you need to answer: where did it come from, who signed it, and does it match the expected release manifest? These commands provide that evidence path.
Baseline verification flow
Adopt this order in CI to reduce blind spots:
01Generate SBOM for each release artifact set.
02Sign policy and package artifacts with controlled keys.
03Generate and verify manifests in deployment pipelines.
04Validate buildinfo for reproducibility and provenance checks.
Generate an SBOM
Emit CycloneDX JSON for this binary and dependencies.
faramesh sbom > faramesh.cdx.json
Sign and verify artifacts
Use Ed25519 keys for detached signature workflows.
faramesh sign file --private-key ./ed25519-private.pem --file ./policy.yaml --output policy.sig.b64
faramesh verify signature --public-key ./ed25519-public.pem --file ./policy.yaml --signature ./policy.sig.b64
Manifest integrity checks
Build and verify SHA-256 manifests for release artifacts.
faramesh verify manifest-generate --base-dir . --output manifest.json ./policy.yaml ./bundle.tar.gz
faramesh verify manifest manifest.json --base-dir .
Build reproducibility metadata
Emit buildinfo and compare against expected fingerprint in CI.
faramesh verify buildinfo --emit > buildinfo.json
faramesh verify buildinfo buildinfo.json
Compliance bundle export
Create deterministic compliance evidence from DPR WAL.
faramesh compliance export --wal /var/lib/faramesh/dpr.wal --out compliance-bundle.json
Common supply-chain gaps
These gaps repeatedly appear in post-incident analysis:
!Signing artifacts but skipping signature verification at deploy time.
!Generating SBOMs once without pinning them to specific release artifacts.
!Using shared signing keys without strict operator separation.
!Treating manifest mismatches as warnings instead of release blockers.