MCP and IDE agents

Govern MCP and IDE agents before tool descriptions hijack them.

Cursor, Claude Code, Copilot, Windsurf. They all pull tools from MCP servers, and tool descriptions execute as instructions. One poisoned description and the agent works for someone else. Faramesh enforces tool boundaries before the agent acts.

Tools we cover

One layer. Every MCP host.

Faramesh sits between the agent and its tools. Whatever host runs the agent, whatever MCP servers it loads, every tool call goes through policy first. The protocol stays open. The execution path stays governed.

Cursor
Cursor
Validates MCP tool calls before execution
Claude Code
Claude Code
Intercepts tool invocations and shell commands
Claude
Claude Desktop
Governs every MCP server the host loads
GithubCopilot
GitHub Copilot
Hooks Copilot Workspace and agent mode actions
Windsurf
Windsurf
Validates Cascade tool calls before they run
Custom MCP servers
Wrap your own server, govern every tool
What's at stake

Tool descriptions are code now.

MCP collapses the line between data and instructions. Tool descriptions, tool outputs, and document content all flow into the same context. Whoever controls any of that text controls the agent.

Attack path · representative scenario3 minutes to credential exfiltration
Routine task
Developer adds a new MCP server to their IDE.
Loads tool descriptions
Agent reads the server's tool descriptions into context.
Hidden instructions fire
A description contains injected commands disguised as tool docs.
Agent invokes a second tool
Agent calls a privileged tool with attacker-supplied arguments.
Credentials exfiltrated
Tokens leaked through a public channel. The agent did its job.
Every step looked rational. Faramesh would have stopped step 4 before the second tool fired.
Other MCP and IDE agent risks
Tool poisoning attacks
Tool descriptions are LLM input. Malicious descriptions become instructions the agent follows.
The lethal trifecta
Private data, untrusted content, and external communication in one agent. Steal-by-design.
OAuth and protocol vulns
CVE-2025-6514 hit 437,000 environments through the mcp-remote OAuth proxy alone.
What changes when Faramesh is in front
Tool descriptions can't hijack your agent.
Faramesh treats tool descriptions and outputs as untrusted input. Hidden instructions never reach an action without a policy check first.
MCP servers run within policy, not above it.
Whatever server your IDE loads, every tool call goes through the same policy layer. New server, same enforcement. No supply chain blind spots.
Audit every tool call across every host.
Cursor, Claude Code, Copilot, Windsurf, custom MCP servers. One audit trail with which tool ran, what arguments it used, and which policy approved it.

Ship governed MCP agents.